Philosophy

1. (a) True or false: Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain are numerically identical.

(b) True or false: Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain are qualitative identical.
(c) True or false: The cans of Campbell’s Tomato Soup stacked on the grocery store shelf are numerically identical. < They are qualitatively identical
(d) True or false: The cans of Campbell’s Tomato Soup stacked on the grocery store shelf are qualitatively identical. Qualitatively – have all the same qualities
(e) True or false: X and Y can be numerically identical but qualitatively distinct?
(f) True or false: X and Y can be qualitatively identical but numerically distinct?
(g) True or false: Personal identity is the numerical identity of persons.
(h) True or false: Personal identity is the qualitative identity of persons. It’s ^

Weirob and Miller agree both that (1) Souls are immaterial (i.e., non-physical) and that (2) souls are the subjects of conscious states (that is, the soul is the thing that thinks, believes, fears, wants, and has experiences). (a) Explain why 1 needs to be true in order to meet Weirob’s challenge. (b) Explain why 2 needs to be true in order to meet Weirob’s challenge.

According to the Same-Body Same-Soul Principle (SBSSP), the same living body is, here on Earth, always accompanied by the same soul. One of Miller’s proposals for how we might establish SBSSP is that we can do so via empirical generalization (crows. All black). Explain Weirob’s objection to this proposal, which involves his box of chocolates example.

1. According to the Same-Body Same-Soul Principle (SBSSP), the same living body is, here on Earth, always accompanied by the same soul. One of Miller’s proposals for how we might establish SBSSP is the Psychological Similarity Argument, which is given directly below.

(a) Which of the following is (are) Weirob’s response(s) to this argument (choose as many as apply): (i) rejects P1, (ii) rejects P2, and/or (iii) rejects the inference from P1 and P2 to C.
(b) Explain Weirob’s reasons for giving this (these) response(s). < give a counter example.

1. According to the Same-Body Same-Soul Principle (SBSSP), the same living body is, here on Earth, always accompanied by the same soul. One of Miller’s proposals for how we might establish SBSSP is the Extrapolation Argument, which is given directly below.

(a) Which of the following is (are) Weirob’s response(s) to this argument (choose as many as apply): (i) rejects P1, (ii) rejects P2, and/or (iii) rejects the inference from P1 and P2 to C.
(b) Explain Weirob’s reasons for giving this (these) response(s).

• P1) I know in my own case that the same soul has been associated with my body.
• P2) Other human bodies are highly similar to my own.
• C) Therefore, by analogy, other human bodies are also associated with the same soul over time.

1. (a) Which of the following is (are) Weirob’s response(s) to Miller’s First Argument Against the Body Criterion, which is given directly below (choose as many as apply): (i) rejects P1, (ii) rejects the inference from P1 to C1, (iii) rejects P2, and/or (iv) rejects the inference from C1 and P2 to C2. (b) Explain Weirob’s reasons for giving this (these) response(s).
2. P1) When I awake and before I open my eyes, I do not know that it is the same body in bed that went to bed the night before.
3. C1) Thus, if the Body Criterion is true, then it is not the case that, when I awake and before I open my eyes, I know that I am the same person who went to bed the night before.
4. P2) But it is the case that, when I awake and before I open my eyes, I know that I am the same person who went to bed the night before.
5. C2) Therefore, the Body Criterion is not true.

1. (a) Which of the following is (are) Weirob’s response(s) to Miller’s Second Argument Against the Body Criterion, which is given directly below (choose as many as apply): (i) rejects P1, (ii) rejects P2, (iii) rejects the inference from P1–P2 to C1, (iv) rejects P3, and/or (iv) rejects the inference from C1 and P3 to C2. (b) Explain Weirob’s reasons for giving this (these) response(s).
2. P1) I can coherently imagine waking up as the same person with a different body.
3. P2) If something can be coherently imagined, then it is logically possible.
4. C1) It is logically possible to wake up as the same person with a different body. (From P1 & P2.)
5. P3) If the Body Criterion is true, then it is not possible to wake up as the same person with a different body.
6. C2) Therefore, the Body Criterion is not true.

According to Memory Criterion 1 (MC1),Y at t2 is the same person as X at t1 if and only if, and because, Y remembers the thoughts and experiences of X. Explain why we should reject MC1—that is, explain Joseph Butler’s both Thomas Reid’s objections to MC1.

According to Memory Criterion 3 (MC3),Y at t2 is the same person as X at t1 if and only if, and because, Y genuinely remembers the thoughts and experiences of X (either directly or via an overlapping chain of memories). And according to MC3, Y, at t2, genuinely remembers the thoughts and experiences of X at t1 (either directly or via an overlapping chain of memories) if and only if, and because, Y at t2 is the same person as X at t1. Explain why MC3 is problematic. <

According to Memory Criterion 4 (MC4), Y at t2 is the same person as X at t1 if and only if, and because, both (i) Y seems to remember the thoughts and experiences of X (either directly or via an overlapping chain of memories) and (ii) Y’s seeming memories of the thoughts and experiences of X are caused in the right way. Explain the Brain Bisection Case and why this case poses a problem for MC4.

The first of three possible responses to the Brain Bisection Case is to claim you do not survive while admitting that you would have survived had just one of the two hemisphere implants succeeded. This response requires adopting Memory Criterion 5 (MC5), which holds Y at t2 is the same person as X at t1 if and only if, and because, (i) Y seems to remember the thoughts and experiences of X (either directly or via an overlapping chain of memories), (ii) Y’s seeming memories of the thoughts and experiences of X are caused in the right way, and (iii) no other beings satisfy both condition i and condition ii.

The second of three possible responses to the Brain Bisection Case is to claim you survive as only one of the two fission products. This response requires adopting the Multiple Occupancy View, according to which there were at least two distinct coinciding people (you and someone else) residing in the same pre-fission body all along. Critically assess this response.

The third of three possible responses to the Brain Bisection Case is to claim you survive as both of the two fission products. Critically assess this response.

1. On which, if any, of the following criteria is survival after bodily death and cremation logically impossible (choose as many as apply and, if none apply, choose ‘none of the above’)? (a) The Body Criterion, which holds that Y at t2 is the same person as X at t1 if and only if, and because, Y’s body is the same as X’s body.
   (b) The Soul Criterion, which holds that Y at t2 is the same person as X at t1 if and only if, and because, Y’s soul is the same as X’s soul.
   (c) The Memory Criterion 4 [which holds that Y at t2 is the same person as X at t1 if and only if, and because, both (i) Y seems to remember the thoughts and experiences of X (either directly or via an overlapping chain of memories) and (ii) Y’s seeming memories of the thoughts and experiences of X are caused in the right way] combined with Four Dimensionalism [which holds that Y’s seeming memories of the thoughts and experiences of X are caused in the right way if and only if both (i) X and Y are just different temporal parts of the same personal space-time worm and (ii) Y’s seeming memories of the thoughts and experiences of X were caused by the physical effects of X’s thoughts and experiences on this personal space-time worm].
   (d) The Memory Criterion 5, which holds that Y at t2 is the same person as X at t1 if and only if, and because, (i) Y seems to remember the thoughts and experiences of X (either directly or via an overlapping chain of memories), (ii) Y’s seeming memories of the thoughts and experiences of X are caused in the right way, and (iii) no other beings satisfy both conditions i and condition ii.
   (e) None of the above.
   (f) For each, if any, of those criteria that you said makes survival after bodily death and cremation logically impossible, explain why such is logically impossible.

1. Choose One: The advocate of the Soul Criterion should respond to the Knowledge Argument, which appears directly below, by

(a) rejecting P1,
(b) rejecting the inference from P1 to C1,
(c) rejecting P2,
(d) rejecting the inference from C1 and P2 to C2,
(e) rejecting P3,
(f) rejecting the inference from C2 and P3 to C3,
(g) accepting all premises and all inferences.
P1) If the Soul Theory is true, then to encounter the same person that we encountered on a previous occasion is to encounter the same soul that we encountered on a previous occasion.
C1) If the Soul Theory is true, then to know that we are encountering the same person we encountered on a previous occasion, we must know that we are encountering that same soul that we encountered on a previous occasion.
P2) We can never know that we are encountering the same soul that we encountered on a previous occasion.
C2) If the Soul Theory is true, then we cannot know that we are encountering the same person that we encountered on a previous occasion.
P3) Sometimes we know that we are encountering the same person that we encountered on a previous occasion.
C3) The Soul Theory is not true.