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Kants View on Morality
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-the good will (referring
to faculty of volition) is the only thing that can be said to be good
without qualification, or good in itself. A good will is a will that
does as reason bids, not as inclination (desire or emotion) demands.
-rationalist view in that it relies on reason only, not experience - |
Imperative
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one rule that we should
always act on
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Kant's Act in Accord with Duty
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If and only if it is the right act, regardless of the motive
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Kants Act Done from Duty
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If and only if one does the right act with the right motive.
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The self-interested
tradesman:“ . . .it is always a
matter of duty that a tradesman should not overcharge an
inexperienced purchaser (57).
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in accord with duty
because it is right to charge a fair price, but it is done from
inclination (desire) and not from duty (out of respect for the moral
law).
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An act with moral worth (Kant)
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An act done from duty alone, with out inclination.
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Hypothetical imperatives
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command conditionally
They are if-then claims: If you want X, then do Y! |
Categorical imperatives
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are not conditional or
hypothetical, but command categorically.
A categorical imperative is in the form, “Do Y!” |
Peter Singer on Equality of Humans
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The principle of the
equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual
equality among humans
it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings |
Speciesism
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A prejudice or bias in
favor of the interests of one’s own species and against the
interests of other species.
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Why is speciesism
wrong, according to Singer?
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If a being can suffer,
there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that
suffering into consideration. YES.
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Singers Value of Lives
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Singer believes that
human lives are, in general, more valuable than the lives of nonhuman
animals
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Why does Steinbock believe
it is justified to treat human interests as weightier than those of
nonhuman animals?
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1) Taking care of our own:
Singer thinks this is a bad reason
2) Higher capacities: Responsibility Capacity for rational altruism Desire for self-respect |
Steinbocks Claim
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it is our higher
capacities that serve to justify the claim that human interests
should be treated as primary
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Important Problem with Steinbock's Claim
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If our higher capacities
justify unequal treatment, why should a human without these
capacities receive more consideration than, say, an extraordinary
chimp?
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