Key Terms/Concepts in the Philosophy of Mind

The claim that one theory or phenomenon is reducible to--fully explicable in terms of--some other theory or phenomenon. Further Information: /red-ism/

A possible relationship between two sets of properties, S1 and S2, such that any differences in S1 entail differences in S2. Further Information: /supermin/

​The distinction between a general concept and particular instantiations of that concept. Further Information:/~folse/Typetoken.html

"According to a famous analogy of Thomas Henry Huxley, the relationship between mind and brain is like the relationship between the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine and the engine itself: just as the steam-whistle is caused by the engine’s operations but has no causal influence upon it, so too the mental is caused by the workings of neurophysiological mechanisms but has no causal influence upon their operation."​Source: /epipheno/

​The view that "mental states are identified by what they do rather than what they are made of." Source and Further Information: /functism/

​The "raw feels" of conscious experience. Further Information: /qualia/

The view that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism

The view that "the mind and the body are composed of different substances and that the mind is a thinking thing that lacks the usual attributes of physical objects: size, shape, location, solidity, motion, adherence to the laws of physics, and so on."​Source: /dualism/

The problem of explaining ​how the mind works vs. explaining (I) why its working should be accompanied by conscious experience (qualia) and (ii) how qualia fit into the natural physical world. Further Information: /hard-con/

An attempt to explain "the distinctive properties of consciousness in terms of some relation obtaining between the conscious state in question and a higher-order representation of some sort (either a higher-order perception of that state, or a higher-order thought or belief about it)."​Source: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/

The claim that there is a 'gap' between an identification of the neural correlates of consciousness and an explanation of why consciousness exists and why it has its peculiar qualitative character.

The view that mental states are identical to physical states of the brain. ​Source: /identity/

1. The Causal Interaction Problem
2. The Other Minds Problem
3. The Dependence Problem
4. The Evolutionary Problem

1. Physicalism Seems to Violate Leibniz's Law
2. Jackson's Knowledge Argument
3. Nagel's Bat Argument
4. Zombies!

An argument against functionalism in the philosophy of mind--and, by implication, certain forms of strong AI--which purports to show that mental states are not exhausted by their functional roles. Further Information: /curriculum/searle_chinese_room/searle_chinese_room.php