Front | Back |
The Self-Defense Principle (Alexander)
|
Some person(s) may be killed if the defender reasonably believes that:
1. The appropriate threshold of danger obtains 2. Killing the person(s) will reduce the danger 3. No more desirable course of action is available that… A. Reduces danger below the threshold, or B. Reduces danger by at least as much as killing the person(s) |
The Other Defense Principle
|
Some person(s) may be killed in defense of your associates or an innocent third party, if you reasonably believe that:
1. The appropriate threshold of danger obtains 2. Killing the person(s) will reduce the danger 3. No more desirable course of action is available that… A. Reduces danger below the threshold, or B. Reduces danger by at least as much as killing the person(s) |
Eye-for-an-eye Retributivism
|
If someone unjustly injures another person, they should have an injury of equal magnitude inflicted upon them
|
Advantages of Eye-for-an-eye Retributivism
|
Punishment is related to crime
Non-contingent, universal standard Provides a measure of how much punishment to inflict on a criminal |
Worries and replies to worries for Eye-for-an-eye Retributivism
|
Inhumane punishment
· Ex: Raping rapists; Torturing torturers · Re: Equal magnitude ≠identical Multiple people killed · Re: Bite the bullet; have to be inhumane to be fair Hard to assess injuries · Ex: Air pollution; Drunk driver; Attempted theft · Re: Hard ≠impossible · Ex: Libel – how much damage? · Re: Probability-weighted injury Victimless crimes · Ex: Prostitution, drugs · Re: EEE Retributivism doesn’t cover every case · Re: Victimless crimes shouldn’t be punished |
Nathanson’s Capped Proportional Retributivism
|
If someone does something wrong they should have an injury inflicted on them that’s proportional to the wrongness of this act up to a certain cap
|
Libertarian Rights Theory (Hurka); rules
|
All persons have a right to the greatest range of liberties compatible with a like liberty for others.
Rule 1. Remove or weaken liberties which prevent others from having those same liberties Ex: Liberty to pollute; liberty to breathe clean air Rule 2. Remove or weaken liberties which prevent others from having other liberties (favoring more important liberties over less important ones) Rule 2a. Broader liberties are more important than narrow ones Rule 2b. Liberties which help to minimize the actual infringements of liberties are more important than those that don’t |
Hurka’s Justification for Libertarian Punishment
|
Part I: Enforcement
Q1. Liberty to violate others’ liberties? A. No Q2. Liberty to stop people from violating others’ liberties? A: Yes Therefore: The liberty to enforce liberties (force threats) minimizes actual infringements of liberties Part II. Carry out threats Q3. Liberties to carry out threats made to enforce our liberties A. Yes The liberty to carry out threats made to enforce our liberties minimizes actual infringements of liberties |
Hurka’s justification for Libertarian Punishment two qualifications
|
Upper limit qualifications: You can only carry out a threat made to enforce liberty, X, if you don’t violate a potential liberty that’s more important than X
Ex: Can’t shoot someone for tickling you Minimum necessary qualification: You can only carry through with a threat made to enforce liberty, X, if there isn’t some lesser punishment which would be just as effective at preventing violations of liberty X Ex: Can’t jail someone for life if 20 years works just as well |
Consequences of Hurka's Libertarian Punishment
|
1. You can only punish someone you’ve threatened
2. Can only punish those who violate another’s liberties (and the violated liberties are at least as important as the ones you’re violating in punishment) 2a. DP only ok for those guilty of murder 2b. Can’t punish victimless crimes 3. Can only inflict a punishment if no lesser punishment is available 3a. DP only ok if no other punishment is efficient 3b. The island criminal should go unpunished |
Primoratz’s Argument for the Death Penalty
|
P1. Eye-for-an-eye Retributivism
P2. The only injury of equal magnitude to death is death C. If someone unjustly kills another person, they should be killed |
Objections to the death penalty; Primoratz’s replies
|
DP violates the absolute right to life
Re: There are no absolute rights DP and laws against killing conflict Re: They don’t – if they did, a similar worry would apply to all kinds of punishment All lives aren’t of equal value All lives are of equal value Long wait makes the DP proportionate Re: Not an argument against DP, just how it is implemented Doesn’t allow for the correction of judicial error Re: Not an argument against DP, just how it is implemented Unfair enforcement (racial bias and unbalance) Re: Not an argument against DP, just how it is implemented |
The Difference Thesis
|
There is a moral difference between killing someone and letting them die (all else being equal, killing is worse)
|
Rachels' reply to the Difference Thesis (The Rachels Argument)
|
The difference thesis is false
P1. In most cases active euthanasia leads to the same result as passive euthanasia, but with less suffering P2. If two acts lead to the same result, but one involves less suffering, than that act is morally better C. In most cases, active euthanasia is better (morally) than passive euthanasia. |
The Counterfactual Account; worries
|
Take 1. If I hadn’t interfered with the course of nature the person would have died anyway
Worry 1. Does it just collapse into the distinction? Worry 2. Is human action a matter of interfering with the course of nature? Take 2. If I wasn’t present, the person would have died anyway Worry: Franz and Hans are both SS officers. Franz tortures someone to death. Hans was right there, and if Franz hadn’t done it, Hans would have. Since the person would have died anyway, Franz just let the person die. |