Evidence - Confessions

(s.76(2)(a))
The word "oppression" in PACE 1984 s.76(2)(a) should be given its natural and ordinary meaning, which imports some harsh, wrongful, cruel or unjust treatment of a suspect.
Held, that the word "oppression" in s.76(2) necessarily imported some impropriety of conduct by the interrogator. It had to be harsh, cruel, or unjust conduct-conduct which was in some way wrongful before the section came into play.

(s.76(2)(a)
It is oppressive for interviewing officers to shout, bully and hector the suspect in interview. An interview obtained in oppressive circumstances is unreliable and not admissible.
Held, that the interviewing officers could not have acted in a more hostile and intimidating manner. Interviewing for 13 hours over 19 tapes, they had made it clear to M that they would continue to question him until they "got it right". In these circumstances the confession should not have been admitted.

(s.76(2)(b))
Unknown to the police, W was suffering from a personality disorder. Whereas the questions asked by the police were not in any sense improper and would not, on the face of them, have constituted undue pressure by the police on an ordinary person in full possession of their faculties, they were, nonetheless, questions which could lead a suggestible or fantasising personality into admissions which could not be taken at face value

(s.76(2)(b)
When first questioned M, being of low IQ, was denied access to a solicitor. M’s low IQ was treated as part of the background which the court had to take into account as a circumstance existing at the time. Denying M access to a solicitor, was held to be something said or done which tended to render M’s resulting confession unreliable, despite the fact that the court know, that M’s confession was true.

(s.78)
A confession was admitted, despite wrongful refusal of access to a solicitor. In confirming that the evidence was admissible, however, Lord Lane noted that there was no evidence of bad faith, and commented that "if the police had acted in bad faith, the Court would have had little difficulty in ruling any confession inadmissible under s 78". It is clear, then that bad faith, in terms of either deliberate deceit, or an awareness of wrongdoing, is an important factor in favour of exclusion.
In exercising its discretion to exclude evidence under s.78, the court will take into account any breaches of PACE Code C which lays down the detailed procedures that must be followed when a suspect is in custody, although breaches will not automatically render evidence inadmissible

(s.76(2)(b)
Very few confession are inspired solely by remorse. Often the motives of an accused person are mixed and include a hope that an early admission may lead to an earlier release or a lighter sentence. If it were the law that mere presence of such a motive led inexorably to the exclusion of a confession, nearly every confession would be rendered inadmissible. That is not the law, commonly the presence of such a hope will at least owe its origin to something said or done.
The court must decide whether the Crown has proven beyond all reasonable doubt that the confession had not been made as a result of things said or done

(s.78)
Upon being arrested, A told the police he was schizophrenic. Despite his medical condition being confirmed by two doctors, A was interviewed in the absence of a solicitor with no appropriate adult present and after a delay of 13 hours, whereupon he made important admissions as well as telling some lies.
A’s confession was held to be wrongly admitted because the fairness of A's trial would be prejudiced by the admission of the police interview. Since he failed to have due regard to the reasons for having an appropriate adult present at interview and the safeguards which could thereby be provided.

Where there are significant and substantial breaches of the PACE 1984 s.58 and the Codes of Practice, prima facie the standards of fairness required by the Act have not been met, whether or not the actions of the officers concerned were bona fide.
The court could see nothing which could properly lead the court to the conclusion that the breach of s.58 made no difference. In the circumstances the presence or absence of other evidence against the appellant made little difference. Proceedings were not rendered fair by the fact that other evidence was available. Accordingly the appeal would be allowed, and the conviction quashed.

The appellant was arrested for armed robbery and requested a solicitor. His request was refused under s.58. After interviews in which he consistently denied the robbery, he admitted burglaries and was charged with them. His solicitor was still refused access and in a further interview he admitted the robbery.
The police could not refuse access after charge, as here when he was initially charged with the burglaries, and the superintendent had to show that his fears under the section were justified in respect of the particular solicitor concerned.

A confession made by a vulnerable person in the absence of an appropriate adult in police interview was unreliable under the PACE 1984 s.76 where there was a realistic likelihood that no admissions would have been made had an appropriate adult been present, or whether that absence was likely to render unreliable any confession which might be made

S.76(2)(b)
Inducement to confess, the investigating officers indicated that they would proceed on two non-payment charges only if he admitted to theft. In the circumstances the Court held that the confession was unreliable and should be excluded

S.76(2)(b)
does not apply where the thing said or done was induced by the accused in his own desperate desire to obtain bail as he was suffering from drug withdrawal

S.78
the police untruthfully told the accused and his solicitor that fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime. This deception on an officer of the court meant that any subsequent confession could not be admitted in the interests of fairness