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Lord Justioce Goff defines battery as "...the actual infliction of unlawful force on another person."
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Collins v. Wilcock (1984)
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D threw a lighted firework into the market place, which had been thrown to him. It exploded in C's face. This was held to be a battery as it was immediate and direct force.
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Scott v. Shepherd (1773)
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A 15 year old boy poured sulphuric acid into teh upturned nozzle of a hand-drying machine. Another pupil used the machine, and got acid in their face. This was held to be a direct result of D's actions and was therefore a battery.
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DPP v. K (1990)
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D pushed C into a swimming pool, and he broke his ankle. He argued that he didn't intend to hurt C, the Court held this was irrelevant as he intended to touch C.
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Williams V. Humphrey (1975)
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A battery is committed even if the original action by D was involuntary, if they subsequently deliberately fail to revoke the action.
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Fagan v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1969)
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Hostile in this case seemed to be little more than D has interferred in a way which C may object.
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Wilson v. Pringle (1987)
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Lord Justice Goff: "...touching will only amount to a battery where it does not fall within the category of physical contacts generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of general life."
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Collins v. Wilcock (1984)
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Lord Goff: "I doubt whether, has been suggested, touching must be hostile to be unlawful. A prank that gets out of hand, an over-friendly slap may transcend the bounds of lawfulness without being characterised as hostile."
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Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilization) (1990)
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D, a pain specialist, performed an operation to relieve the pain of a traped nerve. However, C lost permanent use of tehir right leg. This was not a battery as she had given sufficient consent, if she wanted to make a claim she would have to do so in negligence.
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Chatterton v. Gerson (1981)
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The girl had consented to a surgicl operation and not intercourse so this was not consent.
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R v. Williams (1923)
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Doctors may intervene in the best interests of the patient, whetre they are unconcious and so can't consent to te treatment. However, they should do no more than is reasonably required in the best interests of the patient.
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Re F (1990)
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A person is not to be traeted as being unable to make a decision merely because hye makes an unwise one.
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B v. An NHS Hospital Trust (2002)
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