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United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Company; U.S. Supreme Court (1896)
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The Court ruled that the acquisition of the national battlefield at Gettysburg served a valid public purpose. This was the first significant legal case dealing with historic preservation.
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon; U.S. Supreme Court (1922)
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The court found that if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. This was the first takings ruling and defined a taking under the 5th Amendment.
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Berman v. Parker; U.S. Supreme Court (1954)
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The court held that aesthetics is a valid public purpose. The court found that urban renewal was a valid public purpose.
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Fred French Investing Co. v. City of New York; New York Court of Appeals (1976)
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N this case the city had put in place a regulation that required the placement of a public park on private property leaving no income producing use of the property. The Court invalidated the regulation, but it was not ruled as a taking that should receive compensation.
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Penn Central Transportation Co. v. The City of New York; U.S. Supreme Court (1978)
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The court found that a taking is based on the extent of the diminution of value, interference with investment backed expectations, and the character of the government action. The court weighed the economic impact of the regulation on investment backed expectations and the character of the regulation to determine whether the regulation deprives one of property rights. The court found that the New York City Landmark Preservation Law as applied to the Grand Central Terminal did not constitute a taking.
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Agins v. City of Tiburon; U.S. Supreme Court (1980)
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The Court upheld a city's right to zone property at low-density and determined this zoning was not a taking. The appellants had acquired five acres of unimproved land for residential development. The City adopted zoning ordinances that placed the appellants' property in a zone where property may be devoted to one-family dwellings, with density restrictions permitting appellants to build between one and five single-family residences on their tract. Without having sought approval for development of their tract under the ordinances, appellants brought suit against the city in state court, alleging that the city had taken their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking a declaration that the zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional.
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Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation; U.S. Supreme Court (1982)
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The court found that where there is a physical occupation, there is a taking. The cable television company installed cables on a building to serve the tenants of the building and to serve other buildings. The property owner brought a class action suit claiming that allowing the cable company to occupy the land was a taking.
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First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)
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The court found that if a property is unusable for a period of time, then not only can the ordinance be set aside, but the property owner can subject the government to pay for damages. The court found that the County could either purchase the property out-right or revoke the ordinance and pay the church for its losses during the time of the trial.
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Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)
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The Court found that the enactment of regulations did not constitute a taking. The Court found that the enactment of the Act was justified by the public interests protected by the Act. Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act prohibits coal mining that causes subsidence damage to pre-existing public buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries. The Act requires that 50 percent of the coal beneath four protected structures be kept in place to provide surface support. The Coal Association alleged that this constituted a taking.
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FCC v. Florida Power Corporation; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)
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The Court found that a taking had not occurred. The public utilities challenged a federal statute that authorized the Federal Communications Commission to regulate rents charged by utilities to cable TV operators for the use of utility poles.
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)
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The Court found that regulations must serve a substantial public purpose and that exactions are valid as long as the exaction and the project are reasonably related. The court also found that the California Coastal Commission’s requirement to dedicate an easement for public beach access was not reasonable.
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council; U.S. Supreme Court (1992)
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The Court found that there is a taking if there is a total reduction in value (no viable value left) after the regulation is in place, except where derived from the state’s law of property and nuisance. The court found that Lucas purchased the land prior to the development regulations being put in place and so constituted a taking.
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Dolan v. Tigard; U.S. Supreme Court (1994)
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The Court found there must be a rational nexus between the exaction requirement and the development. The rough proportionality test was created from this case. The court found that conditions that require the deeding of portions of a property to the government can be justified where there is a relationship between the nature and extent of the proposed development. The court overturned an exaction that required dedication of a portion of the floodplain by a commercial business that wanted to expand.
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Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency; U.S. Supreme Court (1997)
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The Court in this case was answering the question of whether an owner must attempt to sell their development rights before claiming a regulatory taking of property without just compensation. The Court found that Suitum's taking claim was ripe for adjudication. The petitioner owned an undeveloped lot near Lake Tahoe. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency found that the lot could not be developed under the agencies' regulations, but that Suitum could sell the development rights under the Transfer of Development Rights program. Suitum sued claiming a taking requiring compensation.
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City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd.; U.S. Supreme Court (1999)
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The Supreme Court upheld a jury award of $1.45 million in favor of the development based on the city's repeated denials of a development permit for a 190-unit residential complex on ocean front property. The development was in conformance with the city's comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. The court found the repeated denials of permits deprived the owner of all economically viable use of the land.
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